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Automation Now and Then: Automation Fevers, Anxieties and Utopias
The cybernation revolution has been brought about by the combination of the 
computer and the automated self-regulating machine. This results in a system of 
almost unlimited productive capacity which requires progressively less human labor. 
Cybernation is already reorganising the economic and social system to meet its own 
needs’(Statement: Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution). 
Automation anxiety is a cyclical phenomenon. This article examines ways of thinking about 
the recurrence of automation debates in culture, particularly with reference to the 1950s, 
1960s and today. We return to earlier automation scares emerging in the 1950s and 1960s 
to focus on engagements between labour, civil rights, left public intellectuals, and emerging 
industrial figures, amongst others, over the question of automation. We also explore 
significant governmental responses. Our aim is to produce a new context for understanding 
and responding to recent left thinking on automation, particularly as it has been used to 
invoke postcapitalist utopias. 
We engage with the concept of topos, drawn from media archaeologist Erkki Huhtamo, to 
think about automation anxiety (and automation fever) as a recurring response to a series of 
new developments in automation, each time new, but also each time drawing on older 
formations, or reviving their salience. Huhtamo also explored automation but, while 
appreciating his methodology, we nonetheless do not follow the trajectory (or archaeological 
trail) he laid down in his work on automation. This suggests a topological shift from 
cybernation to interactivity. In our view a more useful trail can be laid. It leads from the early 
automation debates, through what was known as the cybernation scare, not to interactivity 
(or digital media as communicational culture), but towards generalised precarity, as an 
expected and actual outcome of automation. Left explorations of the prospect of the leisure 
or post-wage society – the latter configuring visions of postcapitalist utopia where 
abundance replaces precarity – are part of this formation. These include, for instance 
Bastani’s demands for Fully Automated Luxury Communism, and more established 
analyses, notably Paul Mason’s Postcapitalism, and Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’s 
Inventing the Future.1  
Our approach is therefore defined broadly speaking as media archaeological. Part of what 
we are interested in is the concept of revived salience. How are automation debates 
unfinished business? How and in what form do tropes evident in earlier debates return? 
What modes of media archaeology may be developed to explore this kind of return?. We 
intend The intention is both to explore a form of ‘doing history’ (what kind of media 
archaeology can register the informing influence of earlier debates or comprehend why, and 
how, certain elements of them travelled and others did not?), and through that to understand
better left responses to technological progress/computational determination.
The paper comes in four parts. We explore the origins of the term automation, significant for 
us because it marks a break with earlier modes of industrial mechanisation. We look at 
‘progressive’ responses to what was known as the cybernation ‘scare’ or the cybernation 
moment of the early 1960s. We move on to ask what we can learn from the cyclicality of 
automation anxiety discourses. Finally, we look at the implications of this analysis for 
discussions of automation on the left. 
We are aware that media archaeological activity may itself contribute to a politics of memory 
and we are influenced by Benjamin’s call to let the past intervene in the present, not as that 
which has been tied into place by subsequent events (the history victors tell, the 
technological culture the market gave us), but as unfinished business. What was never 
resolved in earlier automation debates, and so returns, and what appeared to resolve into 
common sense, or a particular sense of the boundaries of the possible; what we might term 
techno-capitalist realism following Mark Fisher, still matters, we argue, because it can trouble
strident claims that a technological utopia really can be delivered this time around. 
Automation in the 1950s 
In the 1950s automation was a word whose meaning was still being debated. Even then 
there were doubts that what it described was entirely new. A 1956 report of the UK 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research opined, ‘Automation…a new word for what 
is both old and new… the use of the word is somewhat confusing’.2 Three competing 
definitions were offered: as an extension of mechanisation through transfer devices that 
moved products from one machining operation to another; as automatic control of whole 
production processes; and as information processing by ‘the electronic digital computer’ 
(p10).   
The U.S. Congress also reported on automation in 1956 via a series of Joint Economic 
Committee (JEC) hearings. At these, the chair, Wright Patman, noted that a term so novel it 
did not appear even in the dictionary had nonetheless achieved such currency that, ‘we can 
scarcely pick up a magazine without finding a reference to it’.3 It made sense, then, that the 
first speaker at the hearings was John Diebold whose Automation: the advent of the 
automatic factory had done much to popularise the term.4 
Diebold acknowledged scepticism about the novelty of automation, admitting that automatic 
control had been a feature of manufacturing since at least the continuous process flour mill 
built in 1784. Nonetheless he was insistent that automation was new, not simply an 
extension of mechanisation. It was not truly found in the use of transfer devices on a 
production line, which Ford Vice-President Delmar S. Harder had been thinking of when 
coining the term in 1947; such ‘Detroit Automation’ was mere mechanisation.5 True 
automation was found in the oil refinery, where petroleum was manufactured through a 
continuous process monitored and controlled automatically, or in new technologies of 
computing and data processing in office work.6  Automation meant the wholesale 
restructuring of production processes as ‘closed and integrated’ systems amenable to 
automatic control, the gathering, transmission and use of information for the purpose of 
optimising production, and the extension of automation ‘as a philosophy’ beyond the factory, 
the traditional realm of mechanisation, into whole new domains such as office work’.7
Diebold drew on ideas espoused by Norbert Wiener, notably in 1948 in Cybernetics: or 
control and communication in the animal and machine. Wiener envisaged a new age of 
machines succeeding those of the steam engine (nineteenth century) and clockwork 
(eighteenth century).8 This new age would be based on technologies of communication and 
control, particularly on the principle of feedback. Wiener didn’t use the term automation in 
this book but did envisage radical change through the introduction of cybernetically inspired 
systems into society and culture, and it was from him that Diebold drew the idea of a ‘second
industrial revolution’.9 Both cybernetics and Dieboldian automation envisioned a break with 
the mechanisation typical of the industrial age. Wiener suggested that, where the first 
industrial revolution ‘devalued’ the human arm, the second would do the same for the brain. 
Certain specialist brains, ‘the skilled scientist and the skilled administrator’, would survive, 
just as skilled carpenters, mechanics and dressmakers had outlasted the advent of factory 
production, but ‘the average human being of mediocre attainments or less … [would have] 
… nothing to sell that it is worth anyone’s money to buy’.10 
Cybernetics had wide currency in the early 1950s. Wiener’s book was a surprising best 
seller, as Thomas Rid notes,11 and his ideas were central to the interdisciplinary Macy 
conferences between 1946 and 1953, attended by mathematicians and scientists but also 
social scientists and anthropologists - including Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson.12 
Cybernetics showed how a machine could respond to feedback to adapt itself to its 
environment. The analogy is between machine and organism; a machine could be seen to 
regulate itself like a human being or animal, while, as Wiener had shown in his war work, a 
human pilot taking evasive action against anti-aircraft fire could be viewed as a self-
regulating machine.13 Cybernetic ideas thus produced ‘a blurring of the human-machine 
boundary in general’.14 Demonstrations of primitive robots at the Macy conferences helped to
cement the sense that this analogy ‘was powerful because it worked’.15
N. Katherine Hayles, amongst others, has argued that the equivalence cybernetics 
presumed, between human (or animal) and machine, is problematic. Cybernetics understood
both humans and machines to be ‘goal-seeking mechanisms that learn, through corrective 
feedback, to reach a stable state’ (p65). This state (homeostasis) is achieved through 
information flows, so that the analogy relies on the reduction of complex and situated 
behaviour to information processing. The abstraction and valorisation of the concept of 
information as ‘more essential than matter or energy’ produces an understanding of both 
organisms and machines resting on the ‘reification’ of information (p50).
For Hayles cybernetics inaugurates information as the ‘systematic devaluation of materiality 
and embodiment’, a tendency she finds at work in the scientific practice and culture of 
information technology from the 1950s onward (p48). The key for us is Hayles’ reminder that 
the abstraction of information was controversial even in the Macy years. She highlights Macy
conference attendee Donald Mackay’s argument that information needed to be understood 
as structural and contextual rather than simply ‘selective’, and Frank Fremont-Smith’s 
insistence on psychological complexity; his opposition to the reduction of the human subject 
to ‘a black box functioning as an input/output device’.16 It is notable that Wiener too had 
doubts about the applicability of cybernetics to human social systems.17  
So the assertion by cybernetics of a fundamental equivalence between humans and 
machines led to both exhilaration and uneasiness.18 Both this equivalence and the emotions 
it engendered are visible components of the automation anxiety of the 1950s; as Rid 
observes, popular culture frequently featured robots threatening their human creators.19 An 
oft-reproduced cartoon from Leslie Illingworth in Punch in June 1955, for instance, depicts a 
humanoid-like robot with ‘Automation’ emblazoned on its chest towering over factory gates 
bearing the sign ‘Hands Wanted’, while a human worker armed with a spanner cowers in a 
machine shed. Such symptomatic images were not new. Amy Sue Bix notes that the figure 
of the humanoid robot worker was used by cartoonists to depict the threat of technological 
unemployment from the late 1920s onwards,20 while Karel Čapek’s RUR, credited with the 
term robot, received its New York premiere in 1922. 
Diebold thought the equivalence of human and machine in Cybernetics was a mistake and 
could lead to widespread misunderstanding of automation. He resisted the characterisation 
of automation as ‘a mystical pseudoscience of robots and giant brains’.21 However, while 
Wiener saw cybernetics as a major challenge to employment, Diebold’s assessment of 
automation was more cautious, but also optimistic. He warned against exaggerating its 
economic impact and doubted that mass unemployment would be its result. 
Diebold’s general take was reflected in wider political and policy debates. A crucial 
component of discussion around automation in the 1950s was that it took place, as the JEC 
observed, in the context of ‘relatively high employment levels and of a prosperous economic 
situation’.22 Wright Patman trumpeted that ‘not a single witness raised a voice in opposition 
to automation and advancing technology’.23 Labour leaders testifying to the JEC emphasised
they were not opposed to automation but its introduction needed to be managed for the 
benefit of workers.24 The underlying economic assumption of the Congressional report was 
that a trade-off between work and leisure, ‘a choice between added leisure and added 
products and comforts’ could be negotiated.25 
The dominant left political outlook (both in the US and UK) invoked in these early 
discussions of automation was reformist; automation was viewed as a containable 
development that could potentially improve working conditions, so long as managed 
correctly in terms of working hours, training and so on. A British Labour Party discussion 
pamphlet in 1957 saw in automation the potential for a higher standard of living and greater 
leisure.26 But alongside reformist views, there were also, albeit in nascent forms, more 
revolutionary visions of automation. For instance, in the first issue of the Situationist 
International, Asger Jorn railed against the failure ‘to think through the ultimate 
consequences of automation’, and criticised the prevailing socialist productivist vision of 
automation as leading to ever more goods available to the widest possible number.27 Against
the technocratic outlook of ‘automation partisans’, he argued, automation could lead to a 
great new cultural flourishing. The leisure time it opened up, no longer dedicated to pointless
hobbies, could lead the ‘sleeping creator’ in each human to awake. The logic here is of a flip 
in production: automation as the ultimate refinement of standardised consumer production 
paradoxically opens the door to the transcendence of capitalism and its consumerist values. 
The proposition that there might be a ‘tipping point’ in technological progress was not new 
even then. Herbert Marcuse makes a similar argument in ‘Some Social Implications of 
Modern Technology’, one of his first essays published in English. Here, as J. Jesse Ramírez 
has argued, Marcuse was drawing on the pre-war discourse of the American technocracy 
movement, and the left technocratic ideas of Lewis Mumford as expressed in Technics and 
Civilisation, where instrumental rationality transformed itself into something closer to a 
liberation (technology).28  
1950s dreams (or nightmares) concerning automation were based more on an idea than a 
functioning reality. While the digital computer played an important (albeit not totally 
dominant) role in predictions of a more automated future, in mid-1961 there were only 5371 
computers at work in the United States and 40% of those belonged to the military, as Rid 
notes.29 Nonetheless, the idea of automation as a serious proposition, inspired in part by 
cybernetic claims of general systematisation, had taken root, in social and political milieus, 
and for those participating in the construction and circulation of this imaginary, it was 
qualitatively distinct from mechanisation. Its proponents envisioned a second industrial 
revolution, a futurological construction with many sequels – including some still proclaimed in
our own era; for instance in Klaus Schwab’s fourth industrial revolution thesis, or Max 
Tegmark’s Life 3.0.30 
As the 1960s dawned, visions of a world full of information and computation came closer to 
being realised, albeit not necessarily in the forms expected, and as societal impacts of 
automation were felt in the US, the likely acceleration of these impacts was actively 
explored. Computers began to enter ordinary life in a variety of ways, particularly impacting 
the management of clerical and bureaucratic tasks, although they were still far from 
domestic machines. There was also a shift in the cultural imaginary. As Amy Bix points out, 
in cartoons the monstrous robots of the 1950s give way to depictions of mainframe 
computers alongside their subservient human operators.31 However, the terms of this 
controlled/controller relationship were recognised as unstable, subject to change, even by 
advocates of cybernation. In a statement welcoming the cybernation revolution as one of 
three keys to a new and better future, the Ad Hoc Committee for the Triple Alliance, fervidly 
pro-computation, hailing a world of unlimited capacity, noted that ‘cybernation is already 
reorganising the economic and social system to meet its own needs’.32 
The Cybernation Scare of the 1960s
The term cybernation was generated by Donald N. Michael, in The Silent Conquest, a 
pamphlet length discussion of cybernation produced as a report for the Centre for the study 
of Democratic Institutions in 1962.33 Cybernation stood for the acceleration of older forms of 
automation through their coupling with computational technologies, the ‘computer machines’,
that enabled cybernetic systemisation. 
Of particular concern was the expected impact of the automation of work of many kinds 
through the combination of computers and ‘the automated self-regulating machine’.34 The 
cybernation thesis said that computerisation had re-tooled earlier processes of automation, 
more or less those based on mechanisation, to produce a new situation. What was heralded 
was the widespread replacement of human labour by intelligent machines, a development 
entailing massive social upheaval and societal change. Specifically, it would end work. It 
would also problematise the question of leisure: how would time be meaningfully occupied 
beyond the time in which ‘having an occupation’ organised life as a whole? (Few considered 
women outside of work in any of these debates). 
The term cybernation briefly became current in the US in the early to mid-1960s designating 
both a mode of strong technological optimism and a wave of automation anxiety. 
Commentators at the time talked of a ‘cybernation scare’, a rising sense of concern around 
the consequences of technologically delivered upheaval. The crux of this anxiety was not so 
much the fear of being conquered by intelligent machines – although this lurked beneath 
some of the debates – but rather concerns around social upheaval in the run up to full 
automation on the one hand, and the prospects for humans in a society of full leisure that no
longer needed their labour, on the other. A third anxiety, clear on the organised left, 
concerned political power and agency. Stripping the dignity of labour from working ‘men’ 
would take away their power to withdraw it voluntarily, and for some the capacity to refuse to 
work was precisely where such dignity was to be found. 
These arguments were rehearsed through writings and debates around cybernation -  
including notably The Silent Conquest and the responses it produced, and the Manifesto 
produced by the Triple Alliance, both discussed further below. Other forums included for 
instance the First Cybercultural Conference, held in New York in 1964,35 where many of the 
most vociferous protagonists gathered, and the left press. 
The Silent Conquest defined cybernation as referring ‘both to automation and computers’ --  
it was their combination that would produce ‘a profound difference in kind’.36 The cybernation
debaters believed themselves to be at turning point; Weiner’s 1948 prediction of an imminent
choice between ‘good’ or ‘evil’ technology re-circulated. For many the moment of decision 
had come but now the stakes were often understood in political frameworks.37 Echoing 
Weiner, but translating into the language of political science, Michael argued there was 
‘every reason to be concerned with the implications of thinking machines …whose 
capabilities and potentialities were ‘unlimited’ and which had ‘extraordinary implications for 
the emancipation and enslavement of mankind’.38  
The Silent Conquest is a peculiar document, at once detailed and speculative, prescriptive 
and bewildered. It sets out ‘the advantages of cybernation’ (p10), arguing it is necessary for 
the survival of a democratic system, but it also considers a series of problems, predicting 
mass unemployment, suffered unequally so that dominated groups bear the brunt of 
disruption produced by the end of work, and fearing widespread unrest as a result. It predicts
a future society of various ‘leisure classes’ where work becomes a luxury (p29), and, in a 
discussion of life ‘after the take-over’, it speculates on how the inhabitants of a new world will
fill their time; ‘even with a college education, what will they do all their long lives, day after 
day, four-day week after four day week, vacation after vacation, in a more and more crowded
world…What will they believe in and aspire to as they … pursue their self-fulfilling activities 
whatever they may be?’ (p45). The report is cautious, even fearful, but argues that whatever 
the arguments put forward for and against this kind of future it will come. ‘There can be no 
‘moratorium on cybernation’ ( p  42).
The Silent Conquest gained some coverage in the broadsheet press: The New York Times 
ran with a frontpage headline ‘Automation Report Sees Vast Job Loss’ reporting fears of 
‘vast unemployment and social unrest’.39 Elsewhere others considered similar questions. In 
England Sir Leon Bagrit gave the BBC Reith lecture series for 1964, choosing for his subject
‘The Age of Automation’.40 Huhtamo suggests that by the mid-sixties, cybernation concepts 
were being ‘widely debated as markers of a technological transformation… felt to be shaking
the foundations of the industrialised world’.41  Huhtamo’s assessment can be qualified 
somewhat; Michael amongst others noted the widespread ignorance of the likely impact of 
cybernation amongst the general public at the time. In its more technical iterations 
cybernation remained a debate amongst the interested; even while issues at its heart - 
labour, leisure, the future of work, social power in a post-work society - were taken up more 
generally.
Amongst the interested were groups and individuals engaging in progressive politics and 
analysis. They discussed cybernation with the technologists of the nascent tech industry at 
live events (the Cybercultural Conference of 1964 is remarkable for the individuals gathered 
to explore cybernation and the end of work), and through journals. A key output here was the
Manifesto for Triple Revolution, developed by an Ad Hoc Committee of ‘thirty two prominent 
social critics and economists’.42  The Manifesto’s definition of cybernation largely follows that 
developed by Michael, although he was not a signatory. What makes it distinctive is its 
scope and range; it moves beyond the narrower industrial and strictly technical questions 
towards a global vision of a new world order.  
The Manifesto identified ‘three revolutions underway in the world…the cybernation revolution
of increasing automation; the weaponry revolution of mutually assured destruction; and the 
human rights revolution’.43 Cybernation, a revolution brought about by ‘the combination of 
the computer and the automated self-regulating machine’, was essential to all three since ‘if 
peace was the greatest prize, and civil rights the most pressing as a political demand, the 
means identified to bring about change was cybernation’.44 The ‘advent of cybernation’ would
bring an end to ‘job holding as the general mechanism through which economic resources 
are distributed’ and would simultaneously massively expand productive capacity.45 As the 
signatories put it ‘[t]he cybernation revolution…results in a system of almost unlimited 
productive capacity which requires progressively less human labor’ (p5).  
The Triple Alliance is a call for intervention, a call to arms that proclaims it has the arms to 
hand out. Its authors argue cybernation is inevitable, but that, properly deployed, it can have 
a progressive dividend. The perils of failing to cybernate are common ruin, or tyranny - ‘we 
may be allowing an efficient and dehumanised community to emerge by default’.46 In the end
however there is optimism about the prospects: ‘cybernation, properly understood and used, 
is the road out of want and toward a decent life’.47  
This is not only an argument about the sustainability of the economics of a post-work society.
The Triple Alliance demands the invention of new forms of life. As they suggest; ‘cybernation 
at last forces us to answer the historic questions: What is man’s role when he is not 
dependent on his own activities for the material basis of life?’ ( p  9). Echoes of that other 
Manifesto are clear, and the prize here, as it was in Marx’ original, is freedom. The Ad Hoc 
Manifesto proclaims that ‘(a) social order in which men make the decisions that shape their 
lives becomes more possible now than ever before; the unshackling of men from the bonds 
of unfulfilling labor frees them to become citizens, to make themselves and to make their 
own history’ ( p  13). The society of full automation is not at history’s end.   
On the other hand, this is a document that has at least as much to do with J.K Galbraith and 
the Affluent Society as with Marx, and the former was influential in the thinking of some 
signatories to the Manifesto.48 Moreover, if the Triple Revolution document is striking for the 
global contexts within which automation is framed, as a tool for peace, at home it was less 
idealistic in tone, as much concerned with a politics for transition than with outcomes, and 
more prescriptive. As James Boggs, an African American autoworker, civil rights activist, and
signatory to the Manifesto explains: ‘The committee claimed that machines would continue 
to reduce the number of manual laborers needed, while increasing the skill needed to work, 
thereby producing greater unemployment. It proposed that the government should ease this 
transformation through large-scale public works, low-cost housing, public transit, electrical 
power development, income redistribution, union representation for the unemployed, and 
government restraint on technology deployment’ (Boggs, 1963).49 Boggs was an advocate of
full cybernation partly on the basis that organised labour had only grudgingly accepted 
African American workers into its ranks – arguments for the dignity of labour rang hollow for 
those who had been last in,and would, he feared, be first out. 
The Triple Revolution document was published in Liberation, presented to Lyndon B. 
Johnson in March, 1964, and was read in Government circles. It received coverage in the 
mainstream and also in the more specialist press. Winthrop claimed wide circulation in the 
‘avant garde periodicals of ideas’, including The Correspondent, New University Thought, 
The Minority of One.50 It gained traction in labour networks, and circulated amongst civil 
rights activists - it was on the curriculum at the Mississippi free school camps. It percolated 
into the counter-cultural milieus, notably inspiring a story in Harlan Ellison’s 1967 SF 
collection Dangerous Visions: William Jose Farmer’s ‘The Riders of the Purple Wage’ is a 
dystopian take on a future leisure society of staggering violence, marked by banality and 
creativity – and extreme sexism.51  
So, where did the cybernation moment go? The ‘scare’ and the ‘fever’ certainly subsided, 
and the term fell into disuse. James E. Block, in an article entitled ‘The Selling of a 
Productivity Crisis’, assesses earlier discussions of the leisure society, in relation in part to 
the Triple Revolution, asking why public discourse ‘led away from the consideration of a 
society less centred around the workplace’.52 Block identifies a ‘deep collective failure’ to 
confront uncertainties raised by cybernation, blames ‘entrenched interests, who wish market 
inequalities to persist, and do so by shifting the blame onto workers’, but also suggests 
reasons why the debates were not taken up widely on the left. First a non-work centred 
argument aligned with lifestyle revolution that was itself regarded as based on valorising 
‘artificial want’ - in other words arguments for the end of work were bound up with critiques of
rising consumption. He also notes the historical association of the (US) left with the working 
poor (p16), and, we might conclude, with the sectoral interests of the labour organisations. 
He argues that the failure to confront cybernation meant ‘discussions on automation, non-
work society, and alternative forms of distribution held in the late fifties have been deferred 
for a generation.’ (p13). 
Productivity or Knowledge? 
Cybernation, as framed by Donald Michael, and as taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee was 
centrally a matter of the expansion of productivity. Cybernation would produce a society of 
plenty, in which work was largely not necessary, and in which goods would be freely 
available to all (or at least all Americans) including to groups historically discriminated 
against. This understanding of not only the impact of computation on society, but of the 
relationship between productivity, consumption, and automation, is at odds with other 
readings. These include commentaries from industrial concerns. An example is George 
Terborgh’s 1965 report for MAPI, a manufacturers organisation.53 Terborgh argued that 
cybernation was not exceptional; that, as for other moments of technological change 
impacting labour markets, disruption would be less than apocalyptic, and also temporary. He
also argued that cybernation arguments over-emphasised process at the expense of 
changes in production; if consumption could expand to ‘take in’ an increase in production 
then claims computer technology would raise the level of production beyond consumption 
needs were misplaced.  
Other readings were undertaken with a more or less progressive intent. Disentangling liberal 
and left accounts of computation circulating at the time is useful because it can help us 
understand how they travelled on or were submerged.  Of note here is a bad-tempered 
exchange in the New York Review of Books marking an intervention into cybernation 
debates by sociologist Daniel Bell. Bell argued that the productivity presumptions informing 
Donald’s case failed to stack up,54 and that the extent of likely computer use, discussed in a 
(rather wonderfully cautious) Labor Department study, had been exaggerated in the Silent 
Conquest. The problem of demand was at the heart of that issue, and was debated 
elsewhere too.55 In an account of liberal and radical positions around post-industrialism that 
seeks to explore the place of the New Left in the post-industrialism debates, Brick argues 
that Bell, essentially a liberal, ‘refused to consider the alleged obsolescence of work a 
hallmark of post-industrialism’,56 insisting rather that the defining factors concerned 
questions of ‘theoretical knowledge’ (p356). This thesis later informed Bell’s 1970s work on 
the information society, which became key in discussions of modernity/post-modernity and 
its cultural logics. Brick ( p  347) argues that Bell wrote the ‘landmark’ The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society more or less ‘as a response’ to The Silent Conquest.57  
The more narrowly defined debate around cybernation thus fed into to a ‘formative, historical
moment – a period roughly from 1958 to 1967’ of the theory of the post-industrial society in 
general.58 Bell’s later work on the post-industrial society, as a knowledge society, is again an 
indicator here, since as an intervention, it was the one that won out; It was Bell’s vision of the
information society that informs Fredric Jameson’s influential diagnostic work on the cultural 
logics of late capital,59 itself a response to the failure of ‘68 (of revolutionary projects), and an
attempt to grapple with, or find the appropriate figurations for, new forms of technological 
culture. Freed from the discourse of the end of work and the leisure society, the issues of the
rising levels of computerisation within society – and shifts in computing itself (from brute 
automation to refined control, from ungainly giants to office machines, from rarity to 
proliferation, from information controllers to ‘ICT’s), discussions concerning computer 
technology and culture took new turns.  Attention shifted to a techno-politics centred on 
knowledge rather than organisation or (directly) economy; open the databanks to the people 
said Lyotard, in his famous report on knowledge,60 which, it is often forgotten, was produced 
as a commissioned report for the Government of Quebec. We are presenting here a radical 
compression of extremely complex ideas, but indicating ways in which a particular series of 
links between the end of work and computation were apparently uncoupled for a time, their 
topo(i)logical connections submerged. 
The cybernation scare came to nothing - in that the term died, the end of work did not come, 
and many of its key tropes arguments and logics, its grand narratives, were submerged in 
the cultural turns of the late twentieth century on the left – and by globalisation and market 
economics of Thatcherism and its transatlantic counterparts. 
The discourses of cybernation scare did not entirely dissipate. Elements remained to haunt 
associated discourses, even in eras when they did not ‘fit’,61 and today they are certainly 
back in evidence. Cybernation tropes resonate strikingly with new waves of automation, 
particularly around questions of labour and its end, leisure and its prospects, and the relative
prioritisation of transition versus outcome. Attending to these revenant elements is useful in 
responding to automation today, particularly in relation to left accounts of automation and the
leisure society. Considering their trajectory also enables the generation of a more nuanced 
and less ‘corrective’ assessment of the earlier period, and its players.62 
The cyclicality of automation debates 
As we head for the 2020s, reports of the imminent end of labour are once again current. 
Confident predictions that the expansion of automation will impact new job categories, 
terminate the logics of a wage economy, and disrupt life, leisure, and markets are circulating 
afresh. These are fuelled by a new convergence, between big data and its cloud handling, 
the internet of things and developments in robotics, which re-organise the relationship 
between computational operations and the world, and all that comes under the umbrella of 
AI, notably machine learning. The precise factors invoked vary in different accounts. Carl 
Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, in a much cited work, point to machine learning, 
including data mining, machine vision, computational statistics and other fields of AI in their 
assessment, and also underscore the falling cost of computation in general.63 Whatever the 
precise technological configuration, this range of developments, with AI at their heart, 
underpin an extension of automation’s reach and operations – and lead to claims computers 
will take over functions not previously amenable to automation; including roles involving 
emotional labour, or particularly human kinds of intellection. This time around, the ‘end of 
work’, or so we are told, will arise not only for blue collar and lower middle management 
roles, but also for the professions; academics, doctors, lawyers are invoked as potential 
victims (or beneficiaries) of new waves of automation.64  Once again it is useful to consider 
where these ideas are circulating and how those exploring them relate to, or draw down, 
older frames - in particular those already discussed above. In these new contexts in other 
words, how do the older discourses and arguments become salient once again? In particular
how do they relate to, haunt, or inform left discourses?  
This time it’s different? 
Some contemporary proponents of automation anxiety, such as entrepreneur and ‘futurist’ 
Martin Ford, recognise that arguments about the threat/promise of full automation are not 
new. In The Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of Mass Unemployment Ford 
invokes the Triple Revolution thesis as ‘the crest of a wave of worry’ about automation in the 
postwar era,65 and poses the obvious question:
Given that the dire circumstances predicted by the Triple Revolution report did not 
come to pass…. Were the authors of the report definitively wrong? Or did they - like 
many others before them - simply sound the alarm far too soon? ( p  33)
The answer he finds represents a classic restatement of the case that ‘this time it’s different’.
The Triple Revolution got it wrong, he argues, because both computational technologies and
their impacts on the workplace were then only nascent: the 1950s and the 1960s were for 
the most part decades of rising incomes and low unemployment. In our own time both these 
elements have changed. The powerful (yet still, largely invisible) hand of automation can be 
discerned at work in many of the economic ills of our era - such as stagnant wages, the 
decline of labour’s share of jobless recoveries, declining incomes and soaring inequalities 
( pp  34–52). For Ford, this time it’s different then, because now computational automation and
technological unemployment are real. Bastani’s case for luxury communism represents a 
Marxist (or reductionist Marxist) version of precisely the same argument. Now the society of 
plenty, the life beyond the realm of necessity, the promise revolutionaries from 1917 on 
through the cybernation advocates of the 1960s could not deliver because the means of 
production were not sufficiently advanced, is now – effectively - downloadable.66   
The economic foundations of Ford’s argument are disputed; for example in David Autor’s 
sceptical arguments about the extent to which human labour can be automated using current
and projected technologies.67 But the chief interest here is not in whether Ford and other 
contemporary writers are more justified in sounding the alarm about automation than the 
authors of the Triple Revolution report in the 1960s. We are more interested in the cyclical 
tolling of the automation alarm bells than in establishing the validity of the empirical and 
economic basis for sounding them this time around. (From our cultural and historical 
perspective, it seems naive to imagine that automation outcomes rely in any simple fashion 
on currently measurable technological developments and their economic impacts). 
We see rather a need to understand in its own right the recurrence of these automation 
debates in our own age and their broad recuperation of themes from previous cycles. This in
turn demands analysing the cyclicality of automation anxiety and the attitudes to 
computational technologies and social change embedded in it. 
Undertaking this we have focussed on the 1950s and 1960s debates because they both 
evidence a shift into information (in this case from mechanisation to automatic control 
through informatics) and a concomitant focus on labour and its ending. It is this that 
resonates with the contemporary moment in a way that dominant discourses of computation 
in the 1980s and 90s within left milieu do not; there were exceptions – Jeremy Rifkin’s 
intervention might be one of them.68
We perceive in the earlier automation debates in the 1950s and 1960s neither a prescient 
foretelling of contemporary developments nor an example of the way in which, historically, 
fears about technological unemployment have been overstated, (and may therefore be 
safely established as inert precursors to the real thing, and/or as ‘proof’ that such scares 
never out). Our response to Tegmark, Ford, Bastani, and others is not to contest their claims 
in their own terms. We do dispute the presumption, embedded in these arguments to more 
or less explicit degrees, that those exploring automation today have a superior 
understanding of technical formations and their impacts on society, culture, productivity, 
work, and are therefore more able to ‘see’ or ‘call’ revolution than those with more primitive 
technology and a primitive grasp of technology (the two tend to merge, in these arguments). 
This ‘correctionist’69 approach to understanding computational histories rubs out the 
complexity of arguments, the fact of dissent, antagonism, disagreement, the relations of 
power that operated to enshrine particular arguments and bury others, in the past. It reduces
the claims for automation as a disruptive technology in the present to a simple matter of 
having better technology this time around. The social histories that are now being unearthed,
for instance that of the Triple Alliance, can mitigate against this kind of un-reflexively 
technological reading (in which technology is abstracted from discourse and imagination – 
once again ‘reified’) - so long as these earlier times are not invoked in the spirit of what we 
term progressivist correctionism. 
We use this approach to make the case that automation debates not only reflect 
chronologies of technical development,  they even run ahead of them; they also gather up 
attitudes to, and projections of, technology, which may be held and released at different 
times. There is a technological imagination at work in automation anxiety and it travels in 
different ways, and more relatively autonomously from the many material forms in which it 
may be partly instantiated, than might be expected. 
It is in pursuit of this non-linear and anti-teleological approach to technological history that 
media archaeology, drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin and his understanding of 
historical time, has been useful. Benjamin argued that archaeology was necessary politically 
because history ‘belongs’ to the victors. It is what wins out that organises how earlier 
dissenting moments, disputes, disorderly suggestions, are understood. Much of the past is, 
in his terms, thus not available to the present. On the other hand, since this linear 
consignment is political, not inevitable, nor is this past necessarily done with. In this spirit 
media archaeology seeks to argue that the past may continue to act in the present. 
Discerning the cyclicality of automation fever we find a way to respond to the question of 
how this action or return may occur in this case. It goes with the grain of Benjamin’s focus on
complex and non-linear temporalities that disturb linear histories. 
The concept of topos, as developed by Huhtamo,70 and the queer historiography of Valerie 
Traub,71 which deals in matters of revived salience, both presume disjuncture, but also deal 
in disconnected connectivity, and point towards ways to elaborate our thesis. Their 
explorations of the temporal dynamics of various tropes or topoi (those of the body for Traub,
of the technological for Huhtamo), allow them to consider histories of disjuncture but also to 
explore long-standing and sustained connections and recurrences. 
Huhtamo expands on this idea of recurrence as part of a ‘topological’ approach to media 
archaeology, defining it as ‘a way of studying recurring cyclical phenomena that (re)appear 
and disappear and reappear over and over again in media history…seeming to transcend 
specific historical contexts’.72 Topoi, or topics are ‘”pre-fabricated”’ moulds for experience’. 
The term goes back to Quintilanus (via Curtius) for whom topoi were ‘storehouses of 
thought’ or ‘systematically organised formulas’ serving rhetoric.  An example Huhtamo gives 
is how panicked audience reactions to Lumière’s L’Arrivée d’un train à Ciotat (1895) 
resembled those evoked by Étienne Gaspard Robertson’s Fantasmagorie a century earlier. 
The point is that cultural experience of technologies may operate on a different timescale 
from, and in some sense ‘transcend’, more linear histories or chronologies of technological 
development. Apparently unrelated apparatus or technologies of differing eras may call on 
the same cultural traditions or topoi which may then figure (and co-configure?) social 
adoption, experience and commercial exploitation. As Huhtamo emphasises ‘though [topoi] 
may emerge as if ‘unconsciously’, they are always cultural, and thus ideological, constructs’ 
(p222). 
In his work on automation and its recurrence Huhtamo, exploring discourses of the computer
as friend or foe, argues, that ‘underneath the changing surface of machine culture there are 
tenacious and long-lived undercurrents, ‘master-discourses,’ that get activated from time to 
time, particularly during moments of crisis or rupture’.73 We find this work suggestive 
methodologically, but – as should already be clear – we break with Huhtamo’s focus on 
ontological topoi in relation to automation. We rather focus on ‘left topoi’, seeking, as a 
contribution to a new politics of technology, to ‘read’ topoi-logically across old and new left 
debates on automation and the end of work, to ask what of 1960s cybernation, of the fevers,
chills, scares and deliriums amongst the left, that followed the rise of automation discourse in
the 1950s and1960s travelled, submarined, died, or now re-emerges? Moreover what does 
this tell us about ‘master discourses’ of left technopolitics? 
Automation and the left
This final section explores automation anxiety and contemporary left analysis of automation 
possibilities in relation to debates about postcapitalism, accelerationism and the ends of 
work. As in the 1960s, new debates on automation and the end of work are being had 
(including, in their applied form, UBI as a successor to earlier Living Wage proposals) - 
oOften these debates are between experts, but also in popular discourse where they are 
less rehearsed and come with different emphases. We argue contemporary left arguments 
around automation, accelerationism and postcapitalism demand to be read within the 
broader historical contexts of these earlier waves.74 Doing so both locates contemporary 
automation within a continuous if disjunctive history of left technophile engagement, and 
enables a critique of particular forms of left automation desire/fever; specifically those which 
rely on technology ‘on its own’ to lead beyond capitalism. 
First here let us turn, for a representative account of automation, to Srnicek and Williams’ 
calls for full automation. In their work automation presents itself as an apparently immanent 
techno-economic development which, if embraced by the left, can lead beyond capitalism: 
Without full automation, postcapitalist futures must necessarily choose between 
abundance at the expense of freedom…or freedom at the expense of abundance, 
represented by primitivist dystopias. With automation, by contrast, machines can 
increasingly produce all necessary goods and services, while also releasing 
humanity from the effort of producing them. For this reason, we argue that the 
tendencies towards automation and the replacement of human labour should be 
enthusiastically accelerated and targeted as a political project of the left. This …takes
an existing capitalist tendency and seeks to push it beyond the acceptable 
parameters of capitalist social relations.75 
In other words, today automation is invoked once again as an escape route for the left. It 
offers a means through which to think through the limits of capitalism, and the difficulty of 
transcending it. This difficulty was felt acutely post-1968 – when a shift in attitudes to the 
prospects for revolution (revolutionary uprising and/or the over-throw of capital) was 
widespread – and the switch into a politics where the march of labour had been halted, but 
technology might produce transformation (instead) became marked. The (former) 
accelerationists, and particularly Bastani, claim that contemporary automation produces a 
radically new conjuncture, but nothing about the idea of (promoting) technologically-driven 
transcendence – rather than the relying on the overthrow  -  of capitalism is particularly new. 
Transcendence is key here, and in this context Howard Brick’s assertion of a thread running 
through American twentieth-century thought concerning the ‘postcapitalist vision’, the idea 
that ‘something new and immanent in contemporary social development escaped the 
category of capitalism’,76 is useful. Outside the US we can also see this at work in Asger 
Jorn’s situationist take on the ability of automation to awaken human creative potential. For 
the left automation can provide a vision of the immanent transcendence of capitalism, and 
one that does not have to rely on general theories of capitalist expansion and contradiction 
(the acceleration of the contradictions of the market and computational capitalism as a stage
in that), but finds an alternative road to socialist goals. We read accelerationism in this 
postcapitalist tradition, as embracing automation as a technologically-driven transcendence 
of capitalism. 
As noted, this is not a new vision. Moreover the imminence integral to this vision is cyclically 
renewed, as older tropes are revived in relation to new technological developments and 
imaginaries, as guarantees that ‘this time’ it’s for real. One example of this is the way in 
which automation anxiety is reproduced through new analogies between the human and 
machine, from the self-regulating machine that adapts to the environment to machine 
'learning'. In the 1950s the digital computer becomes the imaginary nexus of a more total 
automation long before it achieves widespread adoption. Similarly the self-driving car 
inspired new waves of automation imagining,77 long before general public uptake or 
commercial viability. What the cyclicality tells us is that what is immanent (in the 
transcendence of capitalism) is not imminent and what is imminent (in current technological 
developments) is probably not immanent – at least in the sense that as delivered, it is bound 
to fall short of the imaginary image, the resonating topoi – it draws on. 
Full automation as immanent postcapitalist transcendence of capitalism is a chimera. We do 
not mean that technology is an illusion, nor that it does not effect material change.  
Automation is an imaginary that finds new purchase and form in material developments. As a
cyclical development, it is framed in a paradoxical fashion:  it both enables the expansion of 
capitalism – often its ultimate expansion – and offers a means to transcend it. In its latest AI 
guise, these two frames recur once more. This  mode of recurrence suggests (in various 
spheres, but particularly on the left, which is our interest here)  that there is a failure to think 
through the implications of a (politics based on the) technologically-delivered transcendence 
of capitalism. The logic of -technological realism here seems a a mirror image of what Mark 
Fisher called capitalist realism.78  
One striking aspect of this transcendence of automation is that traditional forms of political 
participation and action are set aside by the urgent need to embrace postcapitalist 
automation – which will in any case render old political priorities pointless. We can see this, 
for example, in the way that Srnicek and Williams reject ‘folk politics’79 and horizontalism in 
favour of think tanks, UBI and the ‘enthusiastic’ acceleration and targeting of automation as 
a political project for the left. That is, automation’s promised transcendence of capitalism is 
not only a promise or goal of the left but also dictates the form of politics itself. This is 
manifested in what Srnicek and Williams call ‘non-reformist reformism’:
The demands we propose are therefore intended as non-reformist reforms. By this 
we mean three things. First, they have a utopian edge that strains at the limits of 
what capitalism can concede. This transforms them from polite requests into insistent
demands charged with belligerence and antagonism. Such demands combine the 
futural orientation of utopias with the immediate intervention of the demand, invoking 
a 'utopianism without apology'. Second, these non-reformist proposals are grounded 
in real tendencies of the world today, giving them a viability that revolutionary dreams
lack. Third, and most importantly, such demands shift the current political equilibrium 
and construct a platform for further development. (p116)
The automation agenda outlined here is at the same time reformist and revolutionary, 
utopian and real. While the demands may be ‘utopian’, ‘antagonistic’ and ‘belligerent’, the 
means to achieve them are politely reformist (think tanks) and state led. In other words 
antagonism (e.g. among workers or in class relations in general) is not viewed as, or invoked
as, the source or driving force for a revolutionary end of work. The driving force instead is 
automation as a ‘real tendency’ within capitalism; and once again the latter is – at least as 
construed against revolutionary dreams – realistic, or practical. 
There are various left objections to the automated poscapitalist, ‘post-work’ perspective. 
Frederick Pitts and Ana Dinerstein, for instance, argue that  ‘technology and automation 
cannot be reified as neutral forces the unfolding of which will deliver us a workless world 
supported by the intervention of the state as the new wage payer’.80 Their arguments return 
us to questions of focus – for Pitts and Dinerstein a basic failing is the identification of work 
as the central object of capitalist domination, rather than the ‘antagonistic relationships of 
property, ownership and subsistence’ and the specific forms (abstract labour, value, money) 
that work takes in a capitalist society. Similarly Nathan Brown argues that Srnicek and 
Williams’s are ‘avoiding communism’ rather than ‘inventing the future’ by essentially ignoring 
the extent to which the technology of automation is bound up with capitalist valorisation.81 
From Pitts and Dinerstein’s perspective UBI is a dangerous chimera because it fails to 
reform [or overthrow] these other aspects of capitalist domination, such as the money form 
itself. This failure essentially means social relations remain untouched. Worse, taking away 
the need to work, automation-enabled UBI deprives people of labour as a source of 
collective organisation, resistance to, and intervention in, capitalism, ‘liquidating class 
struggle’ ( p  14).  
We share Pitts and Dinerstein’s suspicions concerning the reification of automation, but this 
latter point about labour is contestable; a central tenet of the contemporary postcapitalist 
vision is that postindustrial societies already deprive workers of collective organisation and 
action. Arguably it is precisely an acceptance of decline of the workplace as a point of 
struggle and resistance, and a lack of faith in the political power of ‘networked’ individuals, 
and/or a more open acceptance of capitalist realism – as an apparently closed horizon that 
may be opened by technology – that makes embracing or accelerating automation such an 
attractive political project in the first place. However, we also want to question the way in 
which automation and automation derived post-work utopias are framed as liberatory. 
Previous generations exploring automation anxiety and ‘automation thinking’ from the left 
explored the implications of an automated end of work differently, and with different results. 
In ‘Socialism in the Developed Countries’ (1965) Herbert Marcuse affirmed the idea, then, as
now, prevalent, that automation represented a potential within capitalist technological 
development that, while ‘not utopian in the slightest’, might result in the abolition of alienated 
labour.82 He was moreover cautious about the kind of liberation an ‘end of work’ would 
deliver – even in the context of a socialist society: 
What does it mean when, in mass technological society, work time – socially 
necessary time – is reduced to a minimum and free time practically becomes full-
time? How do we set about things? … Does it mean that we are all to go out hunting 
and fishing, writing poetry, painting pictures and so on and so forth? … I am 
deliberately being provocative because I feel very strongly that this is one of the most
important questions for Marxism and socialism, and not only for Marxism and 
socialism. We must … not go on talking airily about the flowering of the individual and
dis-alienated creative work: what does it all mean? Because the end of necessary 
work is in sight; it is not a utopia, it is a real possibility. (p178)
For Marcuse these questions suggested a possible critique of the Marxist idea that ‘liberty 
can only develop above and beyond the realm of necessity’. In ‘The End of Utopia’ (1967) he
suggests that a free society might consist not so much in the elimination of necessity as by 
‘letting freedom appear in the realm of necessity – in labour and not only beyond labour’.83  
For Marcuse, then, the relationship between freedom and necessity needed to be 
complicated.  In affluent postwar American society the realm of necessity had already 
colonised the realm of freedom through consumption and the creation of false needs so the 
quantitative reduction of socially-necessary labour did not necessarily result in a qualitatively
different society, since ‘domination and exploitation perpetuate themselves not only in the 
institutions of class society, but also in the instincts and drives and aspirations shaped by 
class society’.84 As Edward Granter suggests, ‘[for Marcuse] the end of work is forever 
forestalled by the need to purchase, to consume, to enjoy’.85 Otherwise put, the end of work 
would not produce the end of work; the automation of production would not liberate us from 
the realm of necessity because leisure and consumption contained their own form of 
unfreedom. For Marcuse the way to counter this was to transform production and labour so 
that the ‘work process itself, the socially necessary work, becomes, in its rationality, subject 
to the free play of the mind, of imagination, the free play with the pleasurable possibilities of 
things and nature’.86 
Marcuse’s account of the end of work could be questioned in various ways. But it is striking 
that he and other left thinkers of the period (notably Arendt), did not embrace the apparently 
possible and imminent automation of their epoch as necessarily liberatory. From Marcuse’s 
perspective, ensuring that the economic benefits of automation are widely distributed, as is 
currently suggested via UBI, might produce abundance, but that would not be enough.  
The concept of technological progress, as a force immanent to capitalism, that – under the 
right conditions – can be turned in a different direction, is dissolved when we study 
automation in the media archaeological vein suggested here. Automation projects a horizon 
which is both real and imagined, and its imagination is founded as much on social, cultural 
and philosophical ideas as technology – which itself materialises these imaginations, and 
constitutes a resource for the imaginary. Its topology however is characterised by a linked 
assertion and denial, the assertion is that this time technology will make something new (the 
technology has reached the level where it can become an actor that remakes a system), and
the denial is precisely that this technology is anything other than purely technological. 
Perhaps we are too anxious that what is once again recurring today, in the visions of those 
confident technology can accelerate freedom, is faith in a reductively defined technology. But
in these contexts, we would prefer to maintain a certain level of anxiety: We are tempted to 
suggest it is essential for the continuance of hope.   
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